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OIR'S Proposed Revision of
"Conclusions" of Feb. 24
draft of NIE 29

1. The Soviet Union has demonstrated great sensitivity over the continued survival of the Tito regime and has made clear that it desires the replacement of this regime by one subservient to Moscow. The Soviet Union has, however, given no evidence that it feels compelled to eliminate Tito at any cost or within any time period. *However, the USSR*
In particular, the Soviet Union in
its treatment of the Tito problem, has neither implicitly or explicitly
must
suggested that it intends to bring about the overthrow of the Tito regime
at any cost or within any time period.
by Soviet or satellite military action.
Instead the Kremlin's position has been that with the "unmasking" of Tito by the Cominform, the Yugoslav people themselves can be expected to take appropriate action. A Soviet decision to attack Yugoslavia, either directly or through the satellites, would therefore probably be motivated by broader considerations than merely the replacement of Tito. It would be based upon a calculation that the conquest of Yugoslavia would immediately and substantially further the over-all Soviet aim of undermining, either for defensive or offensive purposes, the Western power position.

2. The USSR probably estimates that an attack on Yugoslavia, whatever the guise, would carry with it such risks of precipitating general war as to require full readiness for general war before it could be safely undertaken. The USSR might, of course, act against Yugoslavia without the intention of thereby precipitating general war, but it would probably calculate that general war was sufficiently likely to result that it would not make the

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move unless it had reached a stage in the development of its policy where it was willing to let armed conflict determine the outcome of its power struggle with the US.

3. It is highly unlikely that the Tito regime can be overthrown during 1951 by a Soviet-inspired coup or by internal revolt.

4. Recent military build-up in the satellite countries (increase in armed forces, stockpiling, re-equipment, gasoline conservation, stepping-up of war industry, etc.) points to a great increase in satellite capabilities and readiness for military action. This build-up has not been limited to the satellites that would logically be involved in an attack on Yugoslavia, but has included Poland and Czechoslovakia.

5. The Cominform's war-of-nerves against Yugoslavia continues alarmist, there being constant emphasis on Tito's aggressiveness, alleged border violations and preparations for offensive operations, and hints of the inevitable day of reckoning. However, since the summer of 1950 there has been no change in themes or tone sufficient to suggest imminent aggression. Although the themes obviously encompass the gamut of those required for psychological preparation for war, there is nothing about the current treatment that raises a unique danger signal. Moreover, most of the same themes have appeared in the propaganda campaign being waged against Greece and to a lesser extent Turkey.

6. Although these indications reveal a definite Soviet-satellite program to accelerate military and psychological preparedness, they do not

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appear to justify singling out Yugoslavia as a peculiarly sensitive area. We believe that an attack on Yugoslavia will be made in 1951 only if the USSR has decided to place principal reliance on the direct use of force in its conflict with the West. The possibility cannot be disregarded that the USSR may have in fact made such a decision. On the basis of present intelligence, however, we are unable to determine the probability of such a decision having actually been made.

7. We estimate that, against invasion by the armies of the four neighboring satellite powers (Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Albania), Yugoslavia alone could maintain effective organized resistance for about three or four months. Guerrilla-type resistance would continue after collapse of organized resistance.

8. We estimate that, in the event of full-scale invasion by Soviet-satellite forces, Yugoslav forces would be incapable of maintaining effective organized resistance for more than a month.

9. Yugoslav capabilities and morale are such that substantial Western assistance in military materiel might enable Yugoslavia to defend itself successfully against a satellite attack, and even to withstand a Soviet-satellite attack for considerably more than a month. However, such materiel would have to be adapted to the special requirements of Yugoslav forces and would have to be delivered several months in advance of an attack.

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